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Price disparities across locations can occur when sellers in one location have difficulty matching 
with buyers in a different location due to the transaction costs of trading across distance. Spatial 
arbitrageurs exploit these discrepancies by buying goods from locations where prices are low and 
reselling them at locations where prices are high. Electronic channels should lower the 
transaction costs of trading across distance, thereby facilitating buyer/seller matching. It follows 
that electronic trading should reduce spatial arbitrage opportunities, thereby improving market 
efficiency. We test this hypothesis in the automotive market. The distinguishing feature of our data 
is that we can identify the distinct buyers, sellers, and vehicles involved in transactions, giving us 
a detailed look at transaction patterns likely motivated by spatial arbitrage. We conclude that 
traders are engaging in spatial arbitrage within the market but that spatial arbitrage has become 
less prevalent over time due to increased electronic trading. 
Keywords:  Spatial arbitrage, electronic trading, market efficiency, automotive. 
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Introduction 
Supply and demand forces may cause essentially identical goods to trade at different prices in different geographic 
locations. This is the case in markets for goods such as automobiles, agricultural commodities, fuels, electricity, 
building materials, furniture, metals, industrial equipment and machinery, jewelry, and livestock (e.g., Coleman, 
2009; Schuler, 2008). Different prices in different geographic locations create opportunities for traders to purchase a 
good at a location where prices are low, transport it to a location where prices are high, and resell it there at a profit. 
This behavior is referred to as spatial arbitrage (e.g., Baulch 1997; Fackler and Goodwin 2001.) Spatial arbitrage 
relates to the concept of market integration. An integrated market is one in which prices for the same goods at 
location i equal prices at location j plus the cost of transporting goods between locations i and j. If a market is not 
integrated, then there are opportunities for spatial arbitrage.1 
Spatial arbitrage arises due to transaction costs that prevent buyers and sellers in different locations from finding 
each other. For example, suppose seller k at location i has a product for which buyer m0 at location j is willing to pay 
p1, but that seller k and buyer m0 are unable to match because they are in different locations. Suppose that this causes 
seller k to settle for selling the product to buyer ma for price p0, with p0 < p1. This creates a spatial arbitrage 
opportunity for buyer ma, who can transport the product to location j and sell it to buyer m0 at a profit, assuming p1 – 
p0 exceeds the cost of transportation. Spatial arbitrage reveals market inefficiency, because two transactions are 
needed for buyer m0 to purchase the product instead of one.  
Electronic trading should reduce the transaction costs associated with trading across locations by making it easier for 
buyers and sellers to find and to conduct transactions with each other (Bakos 1998; Malone et al. 1987). This should 
make it easier for seller k to transact with buyer m0 directly, thereby eliminating buyer ma’s spatial arbitrage 
opportunity and improving the efficiency with which buyer m0 receives the product. The goal of the present study is 
to examine spatial arbitrage, market efficiency, and the effect of electronic trading in a specific setting – the 
wholesale automotive market.  
We study this market for two reasons. First, we can observe spatial arbitrage with a high degree of precision. This is 
because each transaction contains buyer/seller ID’s and the Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”), which uniquely 
identify the buyer, seller, and vehicle. The granularity and detail of our data allow us to observe buyers who engage 
in spatial arbitrage by buying a vehicle at location i for price p0 and then reselling the same vehicle at location j for 
price p1. Second, the market has steadily been transitioning from physical trading to electronic trading. This allows 
us to examine the effect that electronic trading is having on spatial arbitrage. 
The data consist of over 31 million transactions in the wholesale automotive market from January 1, 2003 to May 7, 
2009. Transactions are conducted both physically and electronically, with the percentage of electronic transactions 
rising from approximately 1% in 2003 to approximately 18% in 2009. We identified 210,149 spatial arbitrage 
transactions, representing approximately 0.7% of the sample. We used logistic regression and discrete choice 
methods to examine the impact of electronic trading on spatial arbitrage. Results show that electronic trading 
activity is negatively associated with the likelihood of spatial arbitrage, thereby indicating that electronic trading 
increases market efficiency. There is also evidence that electronic trading forces arbitrageurs to move vehicles 
greater distances to maintain their profits. We also examined the reasons why some vehicles are arbitraged while 
others are not, concluding that the bounded rationality (due to limited attention) of the original sellers is a 
contributing factor. 
The results contribute to two research streams: the stream on how electronic trading affects market efficiency and 
the stream on market integration and spatial arbitrage. First, the existing research on electronic trading and market 
efficiency has typically examined the phenomenon at a macro-level. For example, researchers have used price 
dispersion as a macro measure of market (in)efficiency and compared dispersion between online and offline markets 
to estimate the effect of electronic trading (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). By contrast, we examine the 
phenomena at a micro-level. We do this by using spatial arbitrage as the measure of market (in)efficiency and 
                                                          
1 Spatial arbitrage should not be confused with arbitrage in a general sense, which typically refers to the 
simultaneous purchase and sale of the same asset for advantageously different prices (e.g., Sharpe and Alexander 
1990.) Spatial arbitrage is a different, although related, concept. We will sometimes abbreviate “spatial arbitrage” as 
“arbitrage” for readability, but all references to “arbitrage” are specific to “spatial arbitrage.” 
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examining how electronic trading activity affects the likelihood of spatial arbitrage on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis. The benefit of this approach is that it allows us to examine the specific mechanism through which electronic 
trading improves efficiency, which often is not possible at the macro-level. Second, the existing research on market 
integration and spatial arbitrage has been limited by the coarseness of available data. Barrett (2005) noted that 
studies in this stream often base conclusions solely on price data, despite the fact that the flow of goods between 
locations is critical to understanding the phenomenon. Data coarseness has also prevented researchers in this stream 
from investigating the behavioral factors that create arbitrage opportunities and the effect of electronic trading on 
arbitrage opportunities. The detail available in our data allows us to overcome this. 
In the next section, we discuss the empirical setting for the study. We then develop hypotheses and describe the data 
used for hypothesis testing. We then present the analysis and results and conclude with a discussion of the 
contributions and limitations of the study. 
Empirical Context 
The empirical context for the study is the wholesale automotive market, which is a business-to-business market for 
the exchange of used vehicles. Transactions in this market in the United States have traditionally occurred at 
physical market facilities where buyers, sellers, and vehicles are collocated.2 Vehicles are traded at physical market 
facilities located throughout the United States. There are multiple intermediaries, referred to as automotive auction 
companies, that operate these facilities. Sellers transport vehicles to market facilities, where they are auctioned in a 
sequential format in which each vehicle is driven, one at a time, into the midst of a group of potential buyers. An 
auctioneer solicits bids for each vehicle, and the seller has the option to accept or reject the high bid. In the past 10-
15 years, electronic trading channels have been added to the market, which we discuss in more detail below. 
Buyers in the wholesale automotive market are used car dealers who use the market to procure approximately 35% 
of the vehicles they sell to retail consumers. 3 As this is a wholesale market, retail consumers are not allowed to 
purchase vehicles, with the exception of vehicles that have open access requirements (typically government 
vehicles.) Although most dealers purchase vehicles in the market for the purpose of reselling them to retail 
customers, some dealers purchase vehicles in order to engage in spatial arbitrage. For example, these dealers may 
purchase a vehicle for price p at market facility i, transport it to market facility j, and resell it there for price p*, with 
the expectation that p* > p. We refer to these dealers as spatial arbitrageurs. We refer to the location at which a 
spatial arbitrageur buys a vehicle as the source location and the location at which the arbitrageur sells the vehicle as 
the destination location. 
Sellers in the market are firms who own multiple vehicles, including rental car companies (e.g., Hertz), banks (e.g., 
Bank of America), automotive manufacturers (e.g., Toyota, Ford) and their finance arms (e.g., Toyota Financial 
Services, Ford Credit), and government agencies (e.g., police departments.) These firms choose to sell in the 
wholesale market for several reasons. First, many lack retail outlets and thus are not equipped to sell to the general 
public. Second, the wholesale market is generally more liquid and predictable than the retail market, which allows 
sellers to dispose of multiple vehicles quickly at a predictable price, although wholesale prices are typically lower 
than retail prices. Used car dealers may also be sellers in the market, in addition to their role as buyers. Perhaps the 
most common reason for a dealer to be a seller in the wholesale market is if s/he cannot or chooses not to sell a 
vehicle in the retail market. In this case, the dealer sells wholesale to another dealer who then attempts to retail the 
vehicle. Another reason for a dealer to be a seller is if s/he is engaged in spatial arbitrage. 
                                                          
2 The market operates differently in other parts of the world. For example, see Lee and colleagues (1998; 1999) for 
analyses of the wholesale automotive market in Japan. 
3 Used car dealers obtain about 50% of the vehicles they sell as trade-ins and the other 15% in miscellaneous ways. 
Source: NADA Data 2009 (www.nada.org/nadadata), page 10. NADA stands for National Automobile Dealers 
Association. 
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Hypotheses Development 
Hypothesis #1: Existence of Spatial Arbitrage 
It is common for prices for the same product to vary across geography. This type of price dispersion has been 
documented repeatedly (see Baye et al. 2006 for a review). In another review, Fackler and Goodwin (2001) 
suggested that spatial arbitrage opportunities are rampant in markets for agricultural commodities but are often not 
exploited due to the cost of transporting products relative to their total value. In our case, we expect prices for the 
same or essentially similar vehicles to differ across geography, as they do in markets for other types of products. We 
also expect these differences to be larger than the costs of transportation in many cases. This is because the average 
price of vehicles in our sample is approximately $10,000, such that even a small percentage difference in price is a 
non-trivial raw amount. Thus, we expect to see some amount of spatial arbitrage in the market. This hypothesis is 
fundamental to the paper and is stated formally below. 
H1: Spatial arbitrage opportunities exist and are exploited in the wholesale automotive market.  
Hypothesis #2: Limited Attention and Spatial Arbitrage 
Conditional on support for H1, our second hypothesis relates to why spatial arbitrage opportunities occur. The 
existence of spatial arbitrage indicates that sellers are making suboptimal choices of where to sell some of their 
vehicles and that arbitrageurs are taking advantage of this by purchasing these vehicles and reselling them at higher-
priced locations. A natural question is why sellers do not sell these vehicles initially at these higher-priced locations, 
thereby retaining the arbitrageurs’ profits for themselves. We posit that one reason that sellers are leaving this 
money “on the table” is bounded rationality due to limited attention. 
Building on the seminal work of Simon (1955), a large body of literature argues that decision makers are limited in 
their ability to process information and to perform multiple tasks simultaneously. Notably, Kahneman (1973) 
suggested that an individual’s attention spent on one task must necessarily reduce the attention available for other 
tasks because of limited processing capabilities. Researchers have recently begun to assess how the limited attention 
of market participants impacts market efficiency. Corwin and Coughenour (2008) found evidence that specialists on 
the New York Stock Exchange allocate their limited attention to their most active stocks during periods of increased 
activity, leading to higher transaction costs for their remaining stocks. Peng and Xiong (2006) showed that investors 
resort to categorical learning behavior and process more market-wide information at the expense of firm-specific 
information because of limited attention. 
In our context, sellers have multiple vehicles in their inventory and must attempt to choose the optimal selling 
location for each of them. We posit that sellers will pay significant attention to the selling location of vehicle models 
which comprise a large portion of their inventory but limited attention to vehicle models which do not. This parallels 
the limited attention arguments used by Corwin and Coughnour (2008) for NYSE specialists. This limited attention 
to vehicle models that make up a small portion of a seller’s inventory will make sellers more likely to choose sub-
optimal selling locations for vehicles of these models. This will increase the probability that these vehicles will be 
arbitraged. This leads to hypothesis 2. 
H2: Seller inattention to a given vehicle model is positively associated with spatial arbitrage activity on vehicles of 
that model. 
Hypothesis #3: Electronic Trading and Incidence of Spatial Arbitrage 
As discussed above, the U.S. wholesale automotive market has traditionally operated as a physical market. In the 
past 10-15 years, the automotive auction companies have introduced electronic channels into the market, although 
these channels have only accounted for a significant portion of transaction volume in the last few years. The most 
commonly used electronic channel is the webcast channel. This channel operates by simulcasting via the Internet the 
auctions as they are occurring at the physical facilities. Buyers can log into the webcast from an Internet browser 
and place bids in competition with buyers who are physically present at the facility.  
We hypothesize that the webcast channel will reduce spatial arbitrage in the market. The intuition behind this 
hypothesis is that the webcast channel makes it easier for buyers to shift their demand to different locations. For 
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example, buyers in locations where prices are high may shift their demand to locations where prices are low. 
Essentially, this means that any buyer can use the webcast channel to source a vehicle from a low-priced location 
and move it to a high-priced location, a role which was previously reserved for spatial arbitrageurs. Thus, we expect 
webcast use to be associated with reduced spatial arbitrage. We use the following model to present this argument 
more formally. We begin with a baseline scenario in which electronic trading is not available. We then examine the 
effect of introducing the webcast channel. 
Baseline Scenario 
First, note that the price discovery mechanism in our context is an auction. Assume that there are n bidders 
competing for vehicle g being auctioned by seller k at location i at time t. Each bidder m has a valuation v for vehicle 
g. Let Vg be the array of bidder valuations for vehicle g, ordered from lowest to highest, i.e., Vg ∈ {v(1), v(2), …, v(n-
1),v(n)}. Denote the bidder with the highest valuation (i.e., v(n)) as bidder ma. Based on standard auction theory 
pertaining to ascending auctions (Milgrom & Weber, 1982), the high bid is equal to the second highest valuation in 
Vg, i.e., v(n-1). Thus, the outcome of the auction is that bidder ma purchases vehicle g at price v(n-1), assuming v(n-1) 
exceeds seller k’s reserve price. 
Next, assume that there are bidders m1 and m2 at location j who value vehicle g at vg,m1 and vg,m2, respectively, where 
vg,m1 > v(n-1) and vg,m2 > v(n-1), but that these bidders do not bid for vehicle g because they are in the wrong location. 
The existence of bidders m1 and m2 presents bidder ma with a spatial arbitrage opportunity. To wit, bidder ma can 
move the vehicle to location j and resell the vehicle at time t+1 at price vg,m1 or vg,m2, whichever is smaller (because 
the winner of this auction need only pay the valuation of the runner-up.) If the difference between vg,m1 or vg,m2 and 
v(n-1) exceeds the cost of transporting the vehicle, then it is rational for bidder ma to behave this way.4 
Effect of Introducing the Webcast Channel 
The webcast channel allows buyers to participate in auctions at remote locations. Assume that bidder m1 (or bidder 
m2 or both bidders – the model holds regardless) uses the electronic channel to participate in the original auction at 
location i. Assume that s/he adjusts his/her valuation downward to account for the cost of transporting the vehicle 
from location i to location j, denoted cTi,j. Thus, rewrite his/her valuation as vg,m1* = vg,m1 − cTi,j. If vg,m1* ≤ v(n-1), then 
bidder m1’s participation affects neither the outcome of the auction nor bidder ma’s spatial arbitrage opportunity. 
However, if vg,m1* > v(n-1), then bidder m1’s participation shifts the array of bidder valuations from Vg ∈ {v(1), v(2), …, 
v(n-1),v(n)} to either Vg ∈ {v(1), v(2), …, v(n-1), vg,m1*,v(n)} or Vg ∈ {v(1), v(2), …, v(n-1) ,v(n), vg,m1*}, depending on whether 
vg,m1* > v(n). Thus, the high bid would increase from v(n-1) to either vg,m1* or v(n), whichever was lower. This means 
that bidder m1 would either be: a) the second highest bidder and force bidder ma to pay vg,m1*, or b) the high bidder 
and pay v(n). This limits the spatial arbitrage opportunity available to bidder ma. In the first case, bidder ma must pay 
more for the vehicle. This reduces his/her potential spatial arbitrage profit by the difference between vg,m1* and v(n-1), 
thereby lowering the probability that s/he will engage in arbitrage. In the second case, bidder ma will not win the 
vehicle, precluding any arbitrage opportunity. This leads to hypothesis 3. 
H3: Webcast bidding activity that affects the price of a vehicle is negatively associated with spatial arbitrage 
activity on that vehicle.5 
Hypothesis #4: Electronic Trading and Conduct of Spatial Arbitrage 
We also posit that the webcast channel will influence the arbitrageur’s choice of destination location. To motivate 
this hypothesis, we first assume that arbitrageurs: a) prefer to purchase vehicles in low-priced locations and resell 
                                                          
4 There are additional transaction costs that bidder ma (and all arbitrageurs) must consider, including transaction 
fees, the opportunity cost of capital, etc. Discussion of these is withheld due to space limitations but is available 
from the authors. 
5 As assumption underlying H3 is that webcast bidders who affect a vehicle’s price would not have otherwise been 
physical bidders if the webcast channel wasn’t available. We provide evidence of the validity of this assumption 
below. 
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them in high-priced locations, and b) prefer to resell at locations close to the source location, all else equal. 
Similarly, we assume that buyers who use the webcast channel: a) are using the channel to source vehicles at prices 
lower than those at their location, and b) prefer to purchase at locations close to their location, all else equal. This 
means that the most attractive destination locations for the spatial arbitrageur are also likely to be the locations of the 
webcast bidders who place bids at the source location. This will make these locations less attractive destinations for 
spatial arbitrageurs. To illustrate, assume that pickup trucks trade at low prices in Dallas but at high prices in 
Houston. This will create an incentive for spatial arbitrageurs to purchase trucks in Dallas and to resell them in 
Houston, but it will also create an incentive for buyers located in Houston to use the webcast channel to purchase 
trucks directly from Dallas. This will cause Houston-based buyers to lower their valuations for trucks sold in 
Houston, thereby making Houston a less attractive destination location for the spatial arbitrageurs. Because webcast 
bids are likely to be from bidders in nearby locations, we posit that when webcast bidding affects the price of a 
vehicle, speculators will choose to transport vehicles to more distant destination locations to complete the spatial 
arbitrage. This leads to hypothesis 4. 
H4: Webcast bidding activity that affects the price of a vehicle is positively associated with the distance that spatial 
arbitrageurs move the vehicle to complete the spatial arbitrage. 
Data 
The data consist of all completed transactions (n = 31,805,961) facilitated by a major automotive auction company 
between January 1, 2003 and May 7, 2009. For each transaction, the data contain identification numbers for the 
buyer and seller (BuyerID and SellerID), the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), the transaction date (Date), the 
transaction price (Price), the vehicle’s make and model (VehicleModel), the vehicle’s odometer reading (Mileage), 
the location at which the transaction occurred (LocationID), the vehicle’s estimated wholesale valuation (Valuation), 
and an indication of the vehicle’s history prior to being sold in the wholesale market (SourceType). There are 93 
locations in the data, which are distributed throughout the United States. Valuation is calculated by the auction 
company based on transactions for similar vehicles over the prior 30 days. SourceType takes one of five values, 
depending on the type of seller and how the vehicle was used in the past. These values are: 1) factory, which refers 
to vehicles sold by automotive manufacturers after having been used as company cars, 2) lease, which refers to 
vehicles sold by leasing companies after the lease has expired, 3) rental, which refers to vehicles sold by rental car 
firms after the vehicle has been retired from rental service, 4) repossession, which refers to vehicles sold by financial 
institutions after the vehicle has been repossessed, and 5) dealer, which refers to vehicles sold by dealers.  
The data also contain the channel through which the buyer purchased the vehicle. Buyers can purchase vehicles 
either in person via the physical channel or via the webcast channel (as discussed above). We use a dummy variable 
(Webcast_Buyer) to denote whether a vehicle was purchased by a buyer using the webcast channel. Note that the 
webcast channel does not affect the mechanism used to determine prices. Prices are determined via an ascending 
auction; a human auctioneer solicits bids until the highest bid is registered. The webcast channel simply gives 
bidders the option to place bids electronically if they cannot (or choose not to) travel to the market facility. Also, the 
webcast channel does not require a behavioral change by the seller, because the seller presents his/her vehicles the 
same way (having them driven into the physical facility) regardless of whether bidders are placing bids in person or 
via the webcast.6 
For transactions in which the buyer purchased the vehicle using the physical channel, the auction company records 
whether the second-highest bid was placed by a bidder using the webcast channel. We coded this as a dummy 
variable (SecondHighBid_Webcast). The auction company records this data to help quantify the impact of the 
                                                          
6 There is another electronic channel available, which is a traditional electronic market in which each vehicle is 
described on a web page where bidders can place bids or purchase the vehicle outright at a posted price. 
Transactions in this channel, which we refer to as the standalone electronic channel, represent 1.2% of the sample. 
The major distinction between this channel and the webcast channel is that the webcast channel augments the 
physical channel, while the standalone electronic channel is distinct from it. We dropped standalone electronic 
channel transactions from our analysis because the price discovery mechanism in this channel differs from that used 
in the physical and webcast channels. Dropping these transactions allows us to maintain correspondence between the 
theoretical model and the empirical context. 
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webcast technology even if a webcast bidder does not win the auction. If a webcast bidder wins the auction (i.e., 
Webcast_Buyer = 1), this data is not recorded. In that case, we set SecondHighBid_Webcast = 0. 
We constructed variables from other variables in the data, including our measure of sellers’ limited attention. We 
measured seller inattention to a given vehicle model h as an inverse function of the number of vehicles of other 
models in seller k’s inventory at time t. We based this measure on the inattention measures developed by Corwin 
and Coughenour (2008). To construct this measure, we first counted the total number of vehicles offered by seller k 
at time t, irrespective of location (TotalVehicles_Sellerk,t). We then counted the total number of vehicles of a specific 
model h offered by seller k at time t, irrespective of location (TotalVehicles_SellerModelh,k,t). We defined 
SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t = (TotalVehicles_Sellerk,t − TotalVehicles_SellerModelh,k,t) / TotalVehicles_Sellerk,t. For 
example, assume seller k offered 10 vehicles on day t, 9 of which were Nissan Maximas and 1 of which was a 
Nissan Pathfinder. For the Nissan Maximas, SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t would be (10 – 9 ) / 10 = 0.1, and for the 
Nissan Pathfinder, SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t would be (10 – 1 ) / 10 = 0.9. The intuition behind this measure is that 
seller k will allocate more attention to optimizing the selling location for Maximas than for Pathfinders, because 
Maximas make up a larger percentage of the seller’s inventory. Thus, the level of our inattention measure should be 
higher for Pathfinders than for Maximas.7 Our label for the measure indicates that it is a proxy for seller inattention, 
as it would be impossible to measure the actual level of inattention that each seller paid each vehicle over the 6+ 
years of the sample. 
Analysis and Results 
Delineation of Speculative Activity  
Although spatial arbitrage has been studied in prior research (see the Introduction section), it has been difficult to 
observe spatial arbitrage behavior with precision because most data sets do not identify the individual buyers, 
sellers, and assets involved in transactions. In other words, most data sets do not permit the analyst to examine 
whether a specific trader purchased a specific item at location i at time t and then resold that same item at location j 
at time t+1. Because the BuyerID, SellerID, and VIN variables in our data uniquely identify buyers, sellers, and 
vehicles, we observe vehicles being flipped in this manner. However, we must infer whether these flips are due to 
spatial arbitrage or to other factors. 
In our context, a flip is a pair of transactions for the same vehicle (identified by its VIN) in which the buyer in the 
first transaction is the seller in the second transaction. A dealer may flip a vehicle for several reasons. First, a dealer 
may flip a vehicle because s/he is engaging in spatial arbitrage. Second, a dealer may flip a vehicle after improving 
it (e.g., repairing dents, painting, etc.), with the expectation that the profits from the flip will exceed the cost of 
improvement. Third, a dealer may flip a vehicle if s/he is unable to sell it in the retail market and chooses to 
liquidate it via the wholesale market. Fourth, a dealer may flip a vehicle if s/he sells it to a retail customer and then 
regains possession at a later date, perhaps if the retail customer trades in the vehicle as part of a subsequent 
transaction or defaults on his/her loan. There are 2,123,718 flips in the data.  
We focus on cross-location flips, or flips in which the vehicle is moved from the location at which it was purchased 
to a different location for resale. Not only is this appropriate based on the nature of our research questions and 
hypotheses, but it also helps us differentiate spatial arbitrage from other types of flips. For example, we cannot tell 
from our data if the buyer performing the flip improved the vehicle. However, we assume that if s/he did, s/he would 
resell the vehicle at the same location from which s/he purchased it in order to eliminate the cost of transporting the 
vehicle to another location. We make the same assumption for flips due to failure to retail the vehicle and vehicle 
repossession. Thus, by studying only cross-location flips, we reduce the possibility that the flips that we consider to 
be motivated by spatial arbitrage are better explained by other reasons. We also used DaysToFlip, which is the 
number of days between the two transactions comprising a flip, to delineate spatial arbitrage from other types of 
flips. We reasoned that spatial arbitrage flips would be completed the most quickly, i.e., they would have the lowest 
DaysToFlip. This is because the goal of the spatial arbitrageur is to maximize profits, and each day that s/he retains 
ownership of a vehicle reduces his/her profits due to his/her cost of capital and depreciation. Flips due to improving 
                                                          
7 A vehicle’s value might also affect how much attention the seller pays it, which we control for in our empirical 
analysis by including Valuation in the specification. 
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the vehicle would be completed the second-most quickly. This is because the buyer will still wish to minimize the 
number of days s/he retains the vehicle, but s/he must retain the vehicle for some period of time to complete the 
improvements. Flips due to failure to sell in the retail market are likely to be completed more slowly to account for 
the time that the buyer is attempting to retail the vehicle. Last, flips due to re-ownership of a previously retailed 
vehicle should take the longest time to complete, with potentially years passing between the original purchase and 
the subsequent resale in the wholesale market. 
Figure 1 depicts the count and average gain (loss) of cross-location flips completed within 60 days. The y-axis 
represents Flipped_PriceDifference, which is the price in the first transaction subtracted from the price in the second 
transaction. The x-axis represents DaysToFlip, and the size of the bubbles represents the number of flips per 
Flipped_PriceDifference level. Two patterns are noteworthy. First, the number of flips declines with DaysToFlip, 
peaking at DaysToFlip = 6.8 Second, the average gain declines with DaysToFlip. This can be seen visually by 
noticing that more of the mass of the bubbles is below 0 at higher DaysToFlip. Also, the correlation between 
average Flipped_PriceDifference and DaysToFlip shown in Figure 1 is −0.77. For comparative purposes, the means 
of Flipped_PriceDifference for DaysToFlip = 7, 21, 35, and 49 days are $1425, $1372, $1216, and $868 
respectively. The average transaction price for the full sample is $10,281, which helps place the values of 
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Figure 1: Flipped_PriceDifference by DaysToFlip. Bubble size reflects the number of flips at that gain/loss for 
that day.  
 
Based on our reasoning and the descriptive data depicted in Figure 1, we classified a cross-location flip as spatial 
arbitrage if it was completed within α days of the original purchase, i.e., if DaysToFlip ≤ α. This assignment 
procedure is likely to yield false positives (e.g., categorizing a flip as arbitrage when it should not be) if α is set too 
high and false negatives (e.g., failing to categorize a flip as arbitrage when it should be) if α is set too low. In our 
hypothesis tests, we set α = 7, and we varied this threshold up and down to test for sensitivity. We used a 
conservative (i.e., low) α threshold for our main results to limit the possibility that cross-location flips were 
motivated by a factor other than arbitrage. There are 210,149 cross-location flips within the data for α=7. Figure 2 
shows the number of cross-location flips for different DaysToFlip. The cumulative line represents the total cross-
location flips up to and including DaysToFlip; this represents the number of observations classified as spatial 
arbitrage flips at different levels of α. 
                                                          
8 The vast majority of transactions at each location are conducted on the same day each week (referred to as “sale 
day” within the industry), with the specific day depending on the location. For example, sale day for locations i, j, 
and k may be Tuesday, Thursday, and Monday, respectively. Thus, the most common values of DaysToFlip for flips 
between locations i and j will be 2 and 9, while the most common values of DaysToFlip for flips between locations i 
and k will be 6 and 13. 
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Figure 2: Number of cross-location flips per DaysToFlip. Cumulative line represents the total cross-location 
flips up to and including DaysToFlip. 
 
The majority of spatial arbitrage is done by a small fraction of the buyers in the market. There are 223,169 buyers in 
the data. 90% of the cross-location flips completed within 7 days are conducted by less than 1% of the buyers 
(n=2,082.) This is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who argued that the majority of buyers in markets do 
not engage in arbitrage. 
Testing H1 
The data allow us to observe flips with perfect accuracy, but we must infer which of these flips represent spatial 
arbitrage. Although our system of distinguishing spatial arbitrage from other types of flips is imperfect, there is 
strong evidence of spatial arbitrage in the market nonetheless. For example, 46,768 (210,149) vehicles were 
purchased at one location and then resold at a different location within 2 (7) days by the same trader, with the 
average Flipped_PriceDifference exceeding $1,100 ($1,200.) Thus, we conclude that there is support for H1. 
Testing H2 and H3 
Assumption regarding the webcast channel and bidder participation 
Prior to discussing our tests of H2 and H3, we first validate a key assumption underlying H3: that bidders use the 
webcast channel to participate in auctions in which they otherwise would not have participated. We used a panel 
regression model to estimate the correlation between the number of purchases a buyer made via the webcast channel 
(#WebcastPurchases) and the number of market locations (#Locations) from which s/he purchased. The 
specification is: 




 βyear Yeart + εl,t, where l indexes 
the buyer and t the year. TotalPurchasesl,t controls for each buyer’s overall purchase volume, cl represents a buyer 
fixed effect, and Yeart are dummy variables for each year, which are included to control for a possible time trend. R2 
is 0.75. β1 is positive and significant (β1 = 0.02, robust standard error = 0.002), and a one standard deviation increase 
in #WebcastPurchasesl,t is associated with a 27% increase in #Locationsl,t. This indicates that buyers use the webcast 
channel to purchase from locations from which they would not have purchased physically, which provides evidence 
of the validity of the assumption underlying H3. 
Testing H2 and H3 
We used logistic regression to examine which factors influenced the probability that a purchased vehicle g would 
later be spatially arbitraged (Arbitraged = 1). This allowed us to test H2 and H3. We set Arbitraged = 1 if a vehicle 
was flipped at a different location within α days of the original transaction (i.e., DaysToFlip ≤ α.) In our main 
results, we set α = 7, but used different values of α for robustness. Because estimating a series of logistic regressions 
for different values of α is similar to estimating a semiparametric hazard model, we also used a Cox proportional 
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hazards model in which the “hazard” occurred if a purchased vehicle was later arbitraged (Cox, 1972). These results 
are similar to those from the logistic regression model and are not reported. 
Several factors could influence the likelihood that a purchased vehicle is later arbitraged, including seller 
characteristics such as limited attention, bidding competition for the vehicle, vehicle characteristics, buyer 
characteristics, location characteristics, and time. These are each included in the specification and described below. 
Seller characteristics, including limited attention: We included SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t in the specification to test 
H2. If H2 is supported, then SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t will be positively correlated with the probability of a vehicle 
being spatially arbitraged. We included TotalVehicles_Sellerk,t in the specification to control for effects attributable 
to the overall volume of vehicles offered by seller k at time t. We also included PctArbitraged_Sellerk, which is the 
number of vehicles sold by seller k that were flipped within 7 days divided by the number of vehicles sold by seller k 
across the entire sample, multiplied by 100. This variable controls for unmodeled seller characteristics that might 
make them prone to having their vehicles arbitraged and can be thought of as a seller “fixed” effect. 
Bidding competition: SecondHighBid_Webcastg and Webcast_Buyerg provide information on the bidding 
competition for vehicle g and correspond to the model used to motivate H3. Recall that if vg,m1* > v(n-1), then bidder 
m1’s webcast participation in the original auction at location i will either: a) require bidder ma to pay vg,m1* instead of 
v(n-1) to win the vehicle, or b) cause bidder m1 to win the vehicle. SecondHighBid_Webcastg captures the first case, 
and Webcast_Buyerg captures the second case. If H3 is supported, then both cases should be negatively associated 
with the probability of a vehicle being arbitraged. Thus, negative and significant coefficients for 
SecondHighBid_Webcastg and Webcast_Buyerg would provide support for H3. However, it is not clear whether the 
coefficient for Webcast_Buyerg will: a) capture the theoretical effect proposed in the model, b) reflect the general 
propensity for buyers who purchase vehicles via the webcast channel to arbitrage vehicles, or c) both. Thus, we are 
less confident in interpreting the coefficient for Webcast_Buyerg as a test of H3 than we are of the coefficient for 
SecondHighBid_Webcastg. 
Vehicle characteristics: We included NormalizedPriceg, which is Priceg divided by Valuationg, in the specification. 
This is because the more a vehicle costs relative to its valuation, the less likely an arbitrageur can turn a profit on it. 
We also included Valuationg, although we had no a priori expectations of its coefficient. On one hand, vehicles with 
higher valuations might be more attractive to arbitrageurs due to potentially higher margins; on the other hand, 
sellers might pay more attention to choosing optimal selling locations for vehicles with higher valuations. We 
included Valuationg2 to allow for a curvilinear relationship. Mileageg is included to control for vehicle quality not 
otherwise captured in Valuationg. We also included Mileageg2. We scaled Valuationg and Mileageg by dividing by 
10,000 so that all variables were of similar magnitude. Source_Type(v)g, with v = {2,3,4,5}, are four dummy 
variables derived from the SourceType variable. We used “factory” as the base case and included dummy variables 
for the other four source types. 
Buyer characteristics: PctArbitraged_Buyerl is the number of vehicles flipped within 7 days by buyer l divided by 
the number of purchases made by buyer l across the entire sample, multiplied by 100. This controls for the 
propensity of the buyer to arbitrage vehicles. Its coefficient should be positive, as buyers who arbitrage more 
vehicles in general should be more likely to arbitrage any given vehicle.  
Location characteristics: Location(i)g, with i = {2,3,…,92,93}, are 92 dummy variables representing the location at 
which the transaction occurred. This controls for the possibility that spatial arbitrage is more likely to originate at 
certain locations than others, perhaps due to the types of vehicles sold, location-specific imbalances between supply 
and demand, or the geographic proximity of a location to other locations.  
Time and other: DieselPricet is the average U.S. diesel price per gallon (in dollars) for the month in which the 
transaction occurred. We retrieved this data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/.) DieselPricet affects the cost of transporting vehicles and thus may influence the 
likelihood of arbitrage. Dayt is the day the transaction occurs, which ranges from 1 (Jan. 1, 2003) to 2,318 (May 7, 
2009.) It controls for unmodeled variables that change over time that might affect the likelihood of spatial arbitrage, 
such as learning by traders in the market, changes in interest rates, incentive programs offered by automotive 
manufacturers, etc. 
The logistic regression specification is shown below. g indexes the vehicle, h indexes the vehicle’s model, k indexes 
the seller, l indexes the buyer, i indexes the location where the transaction was conducted, and t indexes the day of 
the transaction. Table 1 lists descriptive statistics and correlations. The correlations between variables are relatively 
low, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue. The lone exception is the high correlation between 
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DieselPricet and Dayt, which reflects the rise in diesel prices over the time span of the data. Dropping DieselPricet 
from the model doesn’t change the results. 




e , where z = β0 + β1 SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t + β2 
TotalVehicles_Sellerk,t + β3 SecondHighBid_Webcastg + β4 Webcast_Buyerg + β5 NormalizedPriceg + β6 
Valuationg + β7 Valuation2g + β8 Mileageg + β9 Mileage2g + β10 PctArbitraged_Buyerl + β11 








 βlocation(i) Location(i)g 
+ ε g,h,k,l,i,t 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Arbitragedg,k,l,i,t 0.01 0.08 1    
2. SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t 0.84 0.08 0.01 1    
3. TotalVehicles_Sellerk,ta 2.04 3.73 -0.01 0.18 1    
4. SecondHighBid_Webcastg 0.05 0.21 -0.01 0.03 0.08 1    
5. Webcast_Buyerg 0.07 0.26 -0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.06 1    
6. NormalizedPriceg 0.99 0.21 -0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 1    
7. Valuationgb 1.09 0.75 0.00 -0.01 0.14 0.10 0.15 -0.02 1    
8. Mileagegb 5.70 4.29 0.01 -0.03 -0.28 -0.10 -0.15 0.05 -0.56 1   
9. PctArbitraged_Buyerlc 1.07 4.27 0.39 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 1  
10. PctArbitraged_Sellerkc 1.06 1.20 0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.14 0.16 0.14 1  
11. DieselPricet 2.49 0.81 -0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.02 1  
12. Daytd 1.16 0.70 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.13 0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.78 1 
a Scaled by dividing by 100; b Scaled by dividing by 10,000;  c Measured as percentages; e.g., 1.07 is 1.07%;   
d Scaled by dividing by 1,000. 
 
Results: In our estimation, we used clustered standard errors (clustered by location and day) to account for the 
possibility that the error terms for transactions occurring at the same location on the same day are correlated. We 
estimated the model using standard logistic regression (results reported) as well as rare events logistic regression, 
commonly referred to as ReLogit. Results of the ReLogit model do not differ in any meaningful way and are not 
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Table 2: Results of logistic regression model for whether a purchased vehicle is arbitraged. 
Variable Coef. (Std. Error)  Illustration of Practical Significance 
β1: SellerInattention 
Proxyh,k,t 
0.246 (0.016) *** 
Using the example from the Data section, the Pathfinder  
(SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t = 0.9) would be 21% more 
likely to be arbitraged than a Maxima 
(SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t = 0.1.) 
β2: TotalVehicles_Sellerk,t 0.002 (0.002)  No significant relationship. 
β3: SecondHighBid_ 
Webcastg 
-0.060 (0.015) *** SecondHighBid_Webcastg = 1 associated with 5.8% decrease in arbitrage probability. 
β4: WebCast_Buyerg -0.740 (0.026) *** 
Webcast_Buyerg = 1 associated with 52.2% decrease in 
arbitrage probability. 
β5: NormalizedPriceg -0.662 (0.016) *** 
1 percentage point increase associated with 0.7% decrease 
in arbitrage probability. 
β6: Valuationg 0.810 (0.026) *** Increase from $10,000 to $20,000 associated with 77.5% 
increase in arbitrage probability. Inflection point in 
curvilinear relationship reached at approximately $25,800. β7: Valuationg
2 -0.160 (0.008) *** 
β8: Mileageg 0.114 (0.004) *** Increase from 10,000 to 20,000 associated with 11.9% 
increase in arbitrage probability. Inflection point in 
curvilinear relationship reached at approximately 130,000. β9: Mileageg
2 -0.004 (0.000) *** 
β10: PctArbitraged_Buyerl 0.140 (0.000) *** 
1 percentage point increase associated 15.0% increase in 
arbitrage probability. 
β11: PctArbitraged_Sellerk 0.111 (0.003) *** 
1 percentage point increase associated 11.7% increase in 
arbitrage probability. 
β12: DieselPricet -0.071 (0.011) *** 
$1 dollar increase in diesel price associated with 6.8% 
decrease in arbitrage probability. 
β13: Dayt -0.111 (0.013) *** 
Increase from day 1 to day 2,318 associated with 22.8% 
decrease in arbitrage probability. 
SellerType dummies included   
Location dummies included   
Pseudo-R2 0.35   
Log pseudolikelihood -766,679   
n = 31,805,961                                                                                                     * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
The coefficient for SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t (β1 = 0.246) is positive and significant, providing support for H2. The 
example from the Data section provides an illustration of the practical significance of β1. The Nissan Pathfinder 
(SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t = 0.9) in seller k’s inventory would be 21% more likely to be arbitraged than a Nissan 
Maxima (SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t = 0.1.) The coefficient for SecondHighBid_Webcastg (β3 = -0.060) is negative 
and significant, providing support for H3. The magnitude of β3 indicates that vehicles for which 
SecondHighBid_Webcastg = 1 are 5.8% less likely to be arbitraged. The coefficient for Webcast_Buyerg (β4 = 
−0.740) is also negative and significant, providing further evidence for H3. However, as noted earlier, this evidence 
is more equivocal than the evidence provided by β2. Coefficients for the control variables are consistent with 
expectations. For example, NormalizedPriceg (β3 = -0.662) is negative and significant, and the coefficients for 
PctArbitraged_Buyerl (β8 = 0.140) and PctArbitraged_Sellerk (β9 = 0.111) are positive and significant. 
Robustness Checks: To assess whether our results were sensitive to the threshold we used for delineating spatial 
arbitrage from other types of flips, we reran the logistic regression model for different values of α. Figure 3 plots the 
coefficients for SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t, SecondHighBid_Webcastg, and Webcast_Buyerg at α=1, α=7, α=14, and 
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α=21. Coefficients are shown in black and the 95% confidence intervals are shown in gray. The x-axis represents α, 
and the y-axis represents the coefficient and confidence interval estimates.  
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Figure 3: SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t, SecondHighBid_Webcastg, and Webcast_Buyerg coefficients and 95% 
confidence intervals (y-axis) from logistic regression models at different values of α (x-axis). 
 
The SellerInattentionProxyh,k,t coefficient is positive and significant at all levels of α. The coefficients for the 
variables capturing bidding competition, SecondHighBid_Webcastg and Webcast_Buyerg, become less negative at 
increasing levels of α. The SecondHighBid_Webcastg coefficients are negative and significant at all levels of α, 
except for α = 21, while the Webcast_Buyerg coefficients are negative and significant at all levels of α. We draw 
three conclusions from these robustness checks. First, the results are robust to different definitions of what 
constitutes spatial arbitrage. Second, the bidding competition effects attenuate at higher levels of α, indicating that 
they only affect flips that are completed quickly. This makes sense given that bidding competition should only affect 
flips motivated by arbitrage and not flips motivated by other factors such as failure to sell a vehicle in the retail 
market, which take longer to complete. Third, the consistency of the results achieved with α = 1 and α = 7 provides 
evidence that the results are not confounded by the possibility that arbitrages are improving the vehicles, because it 
would be unlikely for an arbitrageur not only to transport but also to improve a vehicle in a single day.  
Testing H4 
We used a discrete choice model to test H4. For every vehicle that is flipped (n=210,149), the arbitrageur must 
choose a destination location. We modeled the utility V of each potential location as follows.  
Vg,h,i,j,t = β1*Distancei,j + β2*Distancei,j * SecondHighBid_Webcastg + β3*Distancei,j * WebCast_Buyerg + 
β4*Distancei,j * DieselPricet + β5*LaggedPriceh,j,t + β6*Supplyh,j,t + β7*Supply2h,j,t + β8*OverallVolumej,t 
where Distancei,j is the distance between the source location and the potential destination location j, DieselPricet is 
the average price per gallon of diesel fuel during the month in which the flip originated (data from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/), LaggedPriceh,j,t is the average normalized price (i.e., price divided by valuation) of 
vehicles of model h sold at location j over the 90 days prior to time t, Supplyh,j,t is the number of other vehicles of 
model h being offered at location j at time t, and OverallVolumej,t is the total number of vehicles sold at location j 
over the 90 days prior to time t. Other variables are defined as above. As is standard in discrete choice modeling, we 
assumed that the arbitrageur chooses the location that yields the highest utility (e.g., Train 2003.) We limited the 
choice set to locations within 1,000 miles of the source location, as only 3.5% of arbitraged vehicles were 
transported more than 1,000 miles. This restriction eliminates locations from the choice set which essentially have a 
0% chance of being chosen, which helps prevent the results from being contaminated by the inclusion of unrealistic 
potential locations and facilitates model convergence. 
We interacted SecondHighBid_Webcastg, WebCast_Buyerg, and DieselPricet with Distancei,j for two reasons. First, 
because these variables do not vary across locations, they must be interacted with a variable that does in order to 
enter the model. Second, we expect them to moderate the (dis)utility of distance. Because we expect arbitrageurs to 
prefer nearby locations over distant locations, ceteris paribus, β1 should be negative. However, β1 should be less 
negative if SecondHighBid_Webcastg = 1 or WebCast_Buyerg = 1, because webcast bidding activity should cause 
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the arbitrageur to have to choose a more distant destination location (see motivation for H4.)9 Thus, positive and 
significant estimates for β2 and β3 would provide support for H4. We expected the coefficient of DieselPricet (β4) to 
be negative, because higher fuel costs should add to the disutility of distance. We estimated the model using a 
multinomial logit specification. Results appear in Table 3. 
Table 3: Results of discrete choice model for arbitrageurs’ choice of destination location. 
Variable Coef. (Std. Error)  
β1: Distancei,j -0.008 (0.000) *** 
β2: Distancei,j * SecondHighBid_Webcastg 0.002 (0.000) *** 
β3: Distancei,j * WebCast_Buyerg 0.005 (0.000) *** 
β4: Distancei,j * DieselPricet -0.001 (0.000) *** 
β5: LaggedPriceh,j,t 0.508 (0.015) *** 
β6: Supplyh,j,t 0.020 (0.001) *** 
β7: Supply2h,j,t -0.001 (0.000) *** 
β8: OverallVolumej,t -0.000 (0.000) *** 
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
β2 and β3 are positive and significant, which provides support for H4. To illustrate the practical significance of the 
estimates, we calculated the elasticity of distance for the Las Vegas destination location. A 1% increase in distance 
from the source location to Las Vegas is associated with a 2.06% decrease in the likelihood that the arbitrageur will 
choose Las Vegas as the destination. However, this elasticitity decreases from -2.06% to -1.53% for 
SecondHighBid_Webcastg = 1 and from -2.06% to -0.78% for WebCast_Buyerg = 1. As expected, β4 is negative and 
significant. The coefficient for LaggedPriceh,j,t (β5) is positive and significant, indicating that arbitrageurs choose 
destinations where prices for the vehicle model h they are arbitraging have been relatively high. The coefficient for 
Supplyh,j,t follows a curvilinear relationship, indicating that arbitrageurs prefer there to be some vehicles of the same 
model h as the vehicle they are flipping, but not too many. 
Discussion 
Our research contributes to the literature on: a) the effect of electronic trading on market efficiency, and b) market 
integration and spatial arbitrage. 
Electronic Trading and Market Efficiency 
Our results provide evidence that electronic trading is making the market more efficient. Because we are studying a 
market in which prices are determined by auction, we follow Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and measure market 
efficiency based on whether each auction results in the good being sold to the bidder with the highest valuation. If 
the good is sold to anyone else, this is considered an inefficient outcome. The fact that spatial arbitrage occurs 
provides evidence of inefficiency in the wholesale automotive market, because for spatial arbitrage to occur, there 
must be a bidder in the market who values the vehicle more than any of the bidders present when the vehicle is 
initially auctioned. This inefficiency is likely due to transaction costs that prevent bidders from participating in 
auctions at remote locations. Electronic trading reduces these transaction costs, improving the likelihood that the 
                                                          
9 WebCast_Buyerg should be interpreted differently in the discrete choice model than in the logistic regression 
model, because the former uses only arbitrage transactions while the latter uses all transactions. Thus, in the discrete 
choice model, WebCast_Buyerg represents whether the arbitrageur purchased the vehicle via the webcast channel. 
In the logistic regression model WebCast_Buyerg represents whether the buyer, arbitrageur or otherwise, purchased 
the vehicle via the webcast channel. 
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bidder with the highest valuation will win the initial auction. This should improve market efficiency and erode 
spatial arbitrage opportunities. Our results indicate that this is happening. 
By focusing on spatial arbitrage and conducting a transaction-level analysis, our results extend the existing research 
on electronic trading and market efficiency. Much of the existing research has used price dispersion as a proxy for 
market efficiency and conducted analysis using aggregate data. Our transaction-level analysis allows us to observe 
the underlying mechanism by which electronic trading affects market efficiency. Observing the behavioral 
mechanism is important because it shows how micro-level behavior leads to macro-level effects. 
The overall volume of electronic transactions is growing within the market. This suggests that the total amount of 
spatial arbitrage should be declining. To examine this, we counted the spatial arbitrage transactions for each year 
from 2003 to 2008. (We dropped 2009 because we do not have data for the entire year.) Figure 4 shows the number 




























Figure 4: Arbitrage and electronic transaction summary statistics by year. 
 
This result is consistent with the interpretation that arbitrageurs act as “market-makers” who provide liquidity to the 
market by taking positions on assets and matching buyers and sellers. Our results indicate that this function of the 
arbitrageur is becoming less valuable as electronic trading becomes more prevalent. This is consistent with findings 
reported in Hendershott and Moulton (2007), who found that floor broker and specialist trading volumes on the 
NYSE declined significantly after the introduction of the OpenBook system, which electronically delivers limit 
order book information to traders off of the physical exchange floor. 
Market Integration and Spatial Arbitrage 
We extend the literature on market integration and spatial arbitrage in two ways. First, existing studies in this stream 
have generally relied on price data to infer the existence and prevalence of spatial arbitrage, despite the fact that the 
flow of products between locations is a critical aspect of the phenomenon (Barrett 2005.) The transaction-level 
granularity of our data allows us to overcome this limitation and improves the precision of our analysis. We find that 
speculation occurs on approximately 0.7% of transactions. This represents a lower bound on the true degree of 
speculation, as we do not observe speculative activity that either originates or terminates at auction companies other 
than the one that provided the data. Second, existing studies in this stream do not examine the behavioral factors that 
generate the price disparities across locations. This is because the coarseness of the data typically used prevents 
direct observation of the arbitrageurs’ and sellers’ behavior. We improve upon this by observing arbitrage activity at 
the transaction-level and by hypothesizing and finding evidence that sellers’ limited attention is partly responsible 
for the price disparities that the arbitrageurs are exploiting. 
Conclusion 
We used an extensive transaction-level data set to examine spatial arbitrage and the effect of electronic trading in the 
context of the wholesale automotive market. Results indicate that sellers’ bounded rationality due to limited 
attention is one of the factors that contributes to the spatial arbitrage opportunities exploited by arbitrageurs. 
Electronic trading has improved market efficiency by allowing any buyer to source a vehicle from a low-priced 
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location and move it to a high-priced location, a role which was previously reserved for arbitrageurs. This has made 
spatial arbitrage more difficult. 
Although we find that electronic trading is associated with less spatial arbitrage, this may not always be the case. It 
is possible that, in some contexts, electronic trading facilitates spatial arbitrage. For example, spatial arbitrageurs 
might purchase products in bulk from one location and then use an electronic channel such as eBay to resell them at 
a profit to buyers in other locations. Examining spatial arbitrage in such a context and determining the contextual 
factors that influence whether electronic trading has a positive or negative effect on spatial arbitrage is an 
opportunity for future research. 
Although our analysis is specific to the wholesale automotive market, the results can be generalized to markets for 
other products such as agricultural commodities, building materials, industrial equipment and machinery, and 
metals. In each of these markets, supply/demand conditions and bounded rationality due to limited attention are 
likely to create pricing disparities across locations for arbitrageurs to exploit. The automotive market is well-suited 
for examining these issues because each product is uniquely identifiable via its VIN, thereby permitting us to 
observe arbitrage at the transaction level. Similar identifiers are available in other markets and will become 
increasingly available as identification and tracking technologies such as RFID become more widely adopted. Future 
research might use methods similar to ours to estimate the incidence of spatial arbitrage in other markets and 
whether spatial arbitrage is affected by electronic trading.  
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